Araştırma Makalesi
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Hume’da Kendilik ve Zaman İdeleri: Bu İki İde Uzlaştırılabilir mi?

Yıl 2019, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 1, 33 - 47, 30.06.2019

Öz

Öz: Kartezyen/Tözsel kendilik (geleneksel kendilik) fikri; kendiliğin/benliğin, algı ve düşünce gibi bütün zihin hallerinin öznesi olan bir fail olduğunu ileri süren bir görüştür. Bu görüşe göre, “ben” tüm zamanlarda kendisiyle özdeş olmalıdır. Ancak, Hume’a göre bizde böyle bir ben idesi yoktur. Şöyle ki, farklı zamanlarda özdeşliğini koruyan bir kendilik düşüncesi bir kurgudan ibarettir. Hume, tüm idelerin izlenimlerden çıkarsandığını savunur (Kopya İlkesi). Fakat sürekliliğini koruyan bir izlenim olmadığı için, sürekli değişmeden kalan bir kendilik idesi de yoktur. Buna karşılık, zaman idesinin çıkarsanabileceği bir zaman izlenimi olmamasına rağmen, Hume bizde zaman idesinin olduğunu iddia eder. Bu yazıda, Hume’un benlik yanılsaması fikri, çağrışımsal imgelem (associative imagination) ve belleğin oynadığı rollere vurgu yapılarak araştırılmaktadır. Bunu yapmak için, Hume’un zaman anlayışının aydınlatılması gerekir. Bu da kendilik ve zaman idelerinin karşılıklı gereklilik (co-dependency) içerisinde olduklarına gönderme yapar. Kopya ilkesini göz önünde bulundurduğumuzda, söz konusu iki idea arasında bir tutarsızlık olduğu göze çarpar. Bu yazıda ayrıca, bu tutarsızlığın ortadan kaldırılıp kaldırılamayacağı tartışılmaktadır.

Kaynakça

  • Baxter, Donald LM. (2016). “Hume on Space and Time.” In P. Russell (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hume (pp. 173-190). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Descartes, Rene (1985a). Meditations on First Philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Eds.), The Philosophical Wrings of Descartes (Vol. I, pp. 1-63). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Descartes, Rene (1985b). Discourse on the Method. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Eds.), The Philsophical Wrings of Descartes (Vol. II, pp. 111-151). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Garrett, Don (1981). “Hume's Self-Doubts about Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review, 90(3): 337-358.
  • Garrett, Don (2008). “Hume’s Theory of Ideas.” In Elisabeth S. Radcliffe (Ed.), A Companion to Hume (pp. 41-57). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Giles, James (1993). “The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity.” Philosophy East and West, 43(2): 175-200.
  • Hume, David (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature. In David F. Norton & Marry J. Norton (Eds.), A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, Vol. I, (pp. 1-401). Oxford: The Calderon Press.
  • Locke, Johne (1999). Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • Melamed, Yitzhak Y. (2014). “What is Time?” In Aaron Garrett (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy (pp. 232-244). London & New York: Routledge.
  • Mermin, N. David (2009). “What's Bad About This Habit.” Physics Today, (62): 8-9.
  • Morrison, Ronald P. (1978). “Kant, Husserl and Heidegger on Time and Unity of 'Consciousness'.” Philosophical and Phenomenelogical Research, 39(2): 182-198.
  • Penelhum, Terence M. (1976). “The Self in Hume's Philosophy.” The Soutwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7(2): 9-23.
  • Pitson, Tony (2002). Hume's Philosophy of the Self. London & New York: Routledge.
  • Waxman, Wayne (2008). “Hume and the Origin of Our Ideas of Space and Time.” In Elisabeth S. Radcliffe (Ed.), A Companion to Hume (pp. 72-88). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

The Ideas of the Self and Time in Hume: Are these Two Ideas Reconcilable?

Yıl 2019, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 1, 33 - 47, 30.06.2019

Öz

Abstract: The Cartesian/Substantial self (the traditional self) is a view which holds that the self is an agent who is the subject of all our mental states, i.e., thoughts, perceptions and so on. It also holds that the self is identical to itself at different times. However, on Hume’s account, we have no such idea. That is, the self preserving its identity through time is a fiction. Hume states that all ideas must be derived from impressions (the Copy Principle). Nevertheless, there is no such persisting impression; so, there is no idea of the persisting self. However, even though, there is no single impression of time that corresponds to the idea of time, Hume argues that we do have the idea of time. This paper investigates Hume’s view that the self is an illusion by concentrating on the role of (associative) imagination and memory. Furthermore, it aims to clarify Hume’s idea of time. It appears that the ideas of the self and time are co-dependent. Yet, Hume rejects that we have the idea of the persisting self; whereas, he admits that we have the idea of time. Considering the Copy Principle, it appears that there is an inconsistency between the two claims at issue. The present paper also discusses whether this inconsistency can be remedied.

Kaynakça

  • Baxter, Donald LM. (2016). “Hume on Space and Time.” In P. Russell (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hume (pp. 173-190). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Descartes, Rene (1985a). Meditations on First Philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Eds.), The Philosophical Wrings of Descartes (Vol. I, pp. 1-63). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Descartes, Rene (1985b). Discourse on the Method. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Eds.), The Philsophical Wrings of Descartes (Vol. II, pp. 111-151). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Garrett, Don (1981). “Hume's Self-Doubts about Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review, 90(3): 337-358.
  • Garrett, Don (2008). “Hume’s Theory of Ideas.” In Elisabeth S. Radcliffe (Ed.), A Companion to Hume (pp. 41-57). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Giles, James (1993). “The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity.” Philosophy East and West, 43(2): 175-200.
  • Hume, David (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature. In David F. Norton & Marry J. Norton (Eds.), A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, Vol. I, (pp. 1-401). Oxford: The Calderon Press.
  • Locke, Johne (1999). Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • Melamed, Yitzhak Y. (2014). “What is Time?” In Aaron Garrett (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy (pp. 232-244). London & New York: Routledge.
  • Mermin, N. David (2009). “What's Bad About This Habit.” Physics Today, (62): 8-9.
  • Morrison, Ronald P. (1978). “Kant, Husserl and Heidegger on Time and Unity of 'Consciousness'.” Philosophical and Phenomenelogical Research, 39(2): 182-198.
  • Penelhum, Terence M. (1976). “The Self in Hume's Philosophy.” The Soutwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7(2): 9-23.
  • Pitson, Tony (2002). Hume's Philosophy of the Self. London & New York: Routledge.
  • Waxman, Wayne (2008). “Hume and the Origin of Our Ideas of Space and Time.” In Elisabeth S. Radcliffe (Ed.), A Companion to Hume (pp. 72-88). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Toplam 14 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular Felsefe
Bölüm Araştırma/İnceleme Makaleleri
Yazarlar

Volkan Çifteci 0000-0001-5576-6255

Yayımlanma Tarihi 30 Haziran 2019
Kabul Tarihi 25 Haziran 2019
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2019 Cilt: 2 Sayı: 1

Kaynak Göster

APA Çifteci, V. (2019). The Ideas of the Self and Time in Hume: Are these Two Ideas Reconcilable?. MetaZihin: Yapay Zeka Ve Zihin Felsefesi Dergisi, 2(1), 33-47.